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Introduction 
 
Raymond Barre’s claim to be an architect of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
rests ostensibly on his activities as the European Commissioner responsible for 
economic and financial affairs (Directorate-General II) and Commission vice-
president from 1967 to early 1973. Commissioner Barre and his staff prepared the 
February 1969 memorandum and the March 1970 communication — widely known 
as the Barre Plans 1 and 2 — which formed the basis of the discussions of the Werner 
Committee.  
 
Much later, following the Maastricht European Council of December 1991, Barre 
became one of the leading political defenders of EMU in France, supporting painful 
fiscal consolidation and tax increases to move to the single currency by 1997, the 
earliest date allowed by the Maastricht Treaty (Mauduit 1995). Even former French 
president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, one of the leading proponents of the single 
currency, came to argue that it would be unrealistic — given the difficulties facing the 
French economy and the high public sector deficit — to start EMU’s final stage three 
by 1997 (ibid). With Pierre Werner, Barre also became co-chair of the ECU Institute 
in Lyon. This private body was created in March 1992 to study the economic effects 
of EMU and to promote the single currency.  
 
However, the true significance of Barre as an architect should be seen in terms of his 
economic convictions. They led him - far earlier than most of his compatriots, and 
against many detractors within French political, policy making and academic circles 
— to support the three main macro-economic stepping stones to EMU: macro-
economic convergence based on low inflation; exchange-rate targeting (through an 
external exchange-rate regime) to reinforce domestic efforts to bring down inflation; 
and capital liberalization. As European Commissioner, and then as French prime 
minister from 1976 to 1981 with a concurrent stint as Finance Minister from 1976-
1978, Barre maintained his consistent support for these three policy goals, although 
without the telos of a single currency by way of official justification. Prior to the 
Delors Report, he never publicly stated his support for the creation of a single 
European currency emitted by a European central bank.1 Barre repeatedly claimed 																																																								
1 This claim is made on the basis of a full survey of Barre’s speeches and interviews   
prior to 1992 (see also Balleix-Banerjee 1999: 36-40). In 1987, Barre called for a 
‘true monetary union within which a true European currency would circulate’ 
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that he was a European by conviction, but his Europeanism remained one in which 
Member States retained control. He was no fan of supra-nationalism (Lequesne 2010; 
Saint-Ouen 1990: 111ff; Soutou 2010). Domestic economic concerns and the 
competitiveness of the French economy were always his priorities.  
 
Unlike previous prime ministerial appointments, Barre had been a marginal political 
figure in France and never an official member of a political party. He was selected, at 
least officially, for his economic expertise by President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The 
president justified his choice on the grounds that Barre, the former academic, was the 
‘the best economist in France’ (‘le meilleur économiste de France’). While this claim 
is debatable at best, Barre had considerable intellectual influence. He was a professor 
at the elite Parisian policy studies institute, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, periodically 
from the late 1950s to 1966 and the author of a political economy textbook that 
appeared in at least sixteen editions over a fifty-year period and was well-thumbed in 
universities throughout France. Barre shaped the economic thinking of a generation of 
students, some of whom went on to dominate the economic and financial 
administration of France and many of its largest banks and companies. As France’s 
leading economist-politician, Barre played a — if not the — central role in the 
construction of a dominant economic vision, labeled la pensée unique by its 
detractors, which formed the ideological underpinning of French support for EMU. 
 
 
Barre as Economist: From the Ivory Tower to the Coal-face of Power 
 
Barre’s economic vision came from a synthesis of very different and often conflicting 
traditions (de Boissieu 2010). As a young academic economist, he declared himself a 
follower of John Maynard Keynes but eschewed Keynesianism as it had developed in 
the post-war period. Barre argued that Keynes’s ideas were limited and had to be 
developed in a number of areas (Barre and Fontanel 1991). De Boissieu (2010) points 
to two main anchors of Barre’s early economic thinking:  late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Swedish economists and the Austrian School. It is revealing of his 
search for alternative economic ideas that one of his earliest academic endeavours 
was to translate Friedrich von Hayek’s The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on 
the Abuse of Reason into French and write the preface (Hayek 1953).  
 
As prime minister and minister of finance, Barre intervened directly in the Eight Plan 
(1976), known as the Barre Plan, which was dominated by an explicit rejection of 
Keynesian reflation. From monetarism, Barre emphasized the need to use monetary 																																																																																																																																																														
(‘veritable union monétaire au sein de laquelle circulerait une veritable monnaie 
européenne’), a position compatible with both a common (parallel) and a single 
currency (Barre 1987: 233). In his 1988 presidential election campaign programme 
(Projet pour la France), Barre used a very similar wording and called for a ‘European 
Reserve System’ which would coordinate national central banks, manage pooled 
currency reserves, promote the use of the European Currency Unit (ECU) and 
elaborate a common monetary policy in relation to the dollar (see also Barre 1988a; 
Barre 1988b). Prior to the Maastricht Summit of December 1991, in the French 
political context, support for ‘monetary integration’ and EMU very rarely indicated 
support for the elimination of national currencies and the creation of a single currency 
emitted by a European central bank (Balleix-Banerjee 1999; Howarth 2001). 
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policy to control the growth of the monetary supply with the aim of maintaining low 
inflation (Barre 1984). This determined focus also reflects the period in which he was 
appointed as prime minister. In the year 1975, French M2 increased by a record 18.2 
per cent. Barre credits his policies with having reduced M2 growth to 10 per cent by 
1980. Repeatedly, both in and out of office, he made clear that the battle against 
inflation was at the heart of any coherent economic and social policy (see, for 
example, Barre 1981; Fuerxer 2002b: 11). He emphasized the need for structural 
reform throughout the French economy to tackle inflation, insisting upon both labour-
market reform and the liberalization of prices, controlled by the state since the 1940s, 
with the aim of increasing competition in a range of sectors to eliminate ‘artificial and 
abusive’, and thus inflationary, profits (Barre 1976; Fuerxer 2002: 37ff). At the same 
time, Barre (1978) recognized the social, political and economic dangers of ‘brutal 
deflation’, opting instead for progressive and continual disinflation and gradual 
adaptation.  
 
On budgetary policy, as prime minister, Barre did not seek necessarily to balance the 
government’s books. However, he was concerned about the tendency of French 
governments to run excessive deficits and called for their reduction and for the need 
to run budgetary policy in tight coordination with monetary policy (Barre 1981). 
Control of fiscal deficits was a crucial part of Barre’s monetarism (Barre 1981; 
Fuerxer 2002b: 61ff). It placed his thinking squarely in the French credit-counterpart 
approach to monetarism of Jacques Rueff (Fuerxer 2002b, chapter 4; Daniel 2008), in 
contrast to the dominant American approach of Milton Friedman which focused 
singularly on the monetary base. Barre argued that a deficit above 1.5 per cent of 
GDP would ‘be seriously damaging for the French economy’ (Barre 1981: 52; 
author’s translation). He regularly challenged the 3 per cent fiscal deficit limit, set by 
Socialist President François Mitterrand at a 9 June 1982 press conference and 
defended by subsequent Socialist governments (Seux 2014), as lax and inflationary 
(Barre 1984; Fuerxer 2002a&b). However, both Barre’s and Mitterrand’s acceptable 
maximum fiscal deficit figures were arbitrarily set, although Barre’s ensured a more 
sustainable debt load. That Mitterrand’s 3 per cent was accepted by the German 
federal government as the Maastricht threshold for an EMU project, regularly 
denounced as deflationary, suggests that Barre was even more cautious on fiscal 
deficits than the German Christian Democrats. 
 
Barre was a consistent supporter of free trade. Unlike much of the French political 
class, he saw the European common market and then the single market as stepping 
stones to gradual international trade liberalization (Fuerxer 2002b: 17ff). As the head 
of the support staff of Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, minister of industry in the Gaullist 
government of Michel Debré, one of Barre’s principal responsibilities was to 
supervise the abolition of tariffs and quotas, as required under the Treaty of Rome. He 
later claimed to have taken to this task with considerable ‘energetic vigour’ (Barre 
1984: 178) and repeatedly denounced any return to protectionism as ‘extremely 
dangerous’ (Barre 1976). In this way Barre positioned himself in what was, in the 
French administration and political class of the 1960s and 1970s, a fringe position.  
 
At the same time, Barre did not advocate the kind of unilateral and total trade 
liberalization upheld by the mainstream trade theory dominant in the English-
speaking world. He was not a doctrinal trade liberal in the Frédéric Bastiat tradition in 
France (Fuerxer 2002a: 18ff). In government, he called for ‘ordered growth’ of trade 
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(Barre, Le Figaro 15 September 1977) and accepted state intervention to ‘manage’ 
trade in sensitive sectors such as automobiles. Unlike most French academic 
economists and the financial administrative elite in the Treasury division of the 
Ministry of Finance, Barre also leaned toward capital liberalization. Again, however, 
he accepted the need for controls in the context of economic adjustment (Barre 1984: 
208). 
 
Barre’s views on exchange rates aligned closely with mainstream French academic 
and political-class thinking from the 1950s onwards and differed markedly from neo-
classical economists (Howarth 2001). The currency was not to be seen as a good like 
any other whose value was determined solely by the push and pull of supply and 
demand. Rather, its value should be defended in a fixed but adjustable exchange-rate 
regime. Barre saw exchange-rate stability as crucial to European market integration 
and the operation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) so dear to President 
Charles de Gaulle. Given Barre’s commitment to capital liberalization and exchange-
rate stability, it is reasonable to assume that his thinking might have taken him down 
the Mundellian route of the triangle of incompatibility, whereby governments can 
maintain only two of the three following goals at the same time:  fixed exchange 
rates, capital liberalization and monetary autonomy. However, Barre accepted that 
devaluations were inevitable and even desirable as long as their perverse effects were 
limited (Barre 1984; Fuerxer 2002a&b).  
 
Barre saw exchange-rate policy as the servant of his monetarism and his drive to root 
out inflationary elements in the French economy (Maes 2004). However, he did not 
see a European exchange-rate regime as a straight-jacket at the complete expense of 
national margin of manoeuvre. In political life, both in government and as a leading 
opposition politician in the 1990s, Barre’s economic preferences were tempered by 
political realism. Internal devaluations (deflationary policies) were desirable but too 
rapidly imposed they would result in social and political upheaval. The Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS), as initially 
conceived in the Bremen Accords, provided an appropriate balance between 
constraint and margin of manoeuvre.  
 
In government and in opposition Barre frequently noted his concern for the French 
trade and current account deficit, a widespread preoccupation in the French political 
class (Howarth 2001). Combined with a determined anti-inflationary stance, the trade 
and current account deficit was an important motivation for the policy of ‘competitive 
disinflation’ that took root in government economic policy under Barre from 1976. It 
became strongly entrenched following the about-face in Socialist government 
economic policy in 1983, when President Mitterrand took the decision to keep the 
franc in the ERM and pursue deflation in France. 
 
Barre might be best described in terms of German Ordo-liberalism, given that he 
wanted France to follow the German model of low inflation and export-led economic 
growth. In the 1970s and 1980s France was a world leader in the export of 
manufactured goods and services, falling behind Germany in the former but far ahead 
in the latter. However, France faced a constant trade and current account deficit while 
Germany was consistently in surplus. 
 
There were three core economic policy ideas which encouraged support for EMU in 
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elite French political, academic and financial administrative circles, although none 
provided compelling reasons: competitive disinflation; a largely fixed, but potentially 
adjustable, exchange-rate mechanism to provide an external constraint; and capital 
liberalization. Collectively, these policy goals have been labeled by detractors as part 
of ‘la pensée unique’ which in English finds its rough equivalent in Margaret 
Thatcher’s ‘there is no alternative.’ (Kahn 1996).  
 
Barre is widely known in France for providing both academic and political leadership 
in promoting these three policies. After having struggled in the wilderness of France’s 
economic policy landscape for over two decades, Barre’s plan of 1976 represented the 
first impetus to ‘la pensée unique’. During the 1980s, this form of argument spread 
thanks to the conversion of important (but always minority) elements in the Socialist 
Party and to the brief liberal spurt of the neo-Gaullists under prime minister Jacques 
Chirac and finance minister Edouard Balladur from 1986 to 1988 (Balladur 1987). By 
the late 1980s, French academic economic thinking had also shifted. It provided few 
obstacles to, and considerable support for, these elements, indispensable to the move 
to EMU. However, it needs to be stressed that few proponents of the core elements of 
la pensée unique, in academic or political circles in the 1980s, were proactive on 
monetary union and very fewcampaigned on the matter prior to 1988. Barre certainly 
did not. 
 
On ‘competitive disinflation’, Barre argued from the 1950s that monetary laxity 
risked weakening the competitiveness of French industry. The spiral of inflation, 
devaluation and then even greater inflation, threatened to develop beyond the control 
of policy-makers. In the context of an increasingly open economy, devaluation 
became increasingly ineffective and even harmful. Barre (1984) argued that France 
should follow Germany in the pursuit of low inflation, along with domestic structural 
reform and microeconomic reforms, to increase the competitiveness of French 
industry in relation to its main trade partners. Although a fringe position in the 1970s, 
by the late 1980s ‘competitive disinflation’ became fully entrenched as 
unquestionable French government economic doctrine on the centre Right and on the 
centre Left, which was then in power (Fitoussi 1993). The pursuit of ‘competitive 
disinflation’ made it easier for French officials to accept the inclusion of the 
convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty, which constitutionalized the goal of 
price stability. However, there was considerable disagreement about the extent to 
which EMU was necessary to achieve this goal. It was advocated as a necessary step 
only by Bank of France officials and a few academics who saw the project as the 
ultimate guarantee of entrenching anti-inflationary monetary policies in a country, the 
politicians and public of which were still prone to excess (Howarth 2001). 
 
Yet, on the issue of exchange-rate stability, Barre saw problems with the growing 
consensus around the EMS from the mid-1980s as a system of fixed rates (Barre 
1984; Fuerxer 2002a&b). He stood in opposition to the Socialist minister of finance in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pierre Bérégovoy, who refused to accept German 
demands after reunification for the realignment of parities within the ERM in order to 
permit the revaluation of the D-Mark vis-à-vis the franc and certain other currencies 
(Howarth 2001). Barre had never been of the opinion that permanently fixed 
exchange rate were desirable (Fuerxer 2002a&b). Further, the move from a system of 
fixed but adjustable rates to EMU was not, for Barre, an intellectually necessary one.  
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Barre in Brussels 
 
In early 1967, Barre succeeded Robert Marjolin as Commissioner responsible for 
economic and financial affairs (DGII) and as vice-president. His five-and-a-half years 
in Brussels corresponded to considerable international monetary upheaval, menacing 
the recently completed European customs union. Barre arrived in Brussels during a 
pound sterling crisis, followed swiftly by a French franc crisis. He left two months 
prior to the German government’s decision to float the D-Mark, forcing the European 
‘snake’ exchange-rate system from its US dollar tunnel.  
 
Barre was the Commissioner responsible for monetary policy during the demise of the 
Bretton Woods System, the first round of intensive discussions on European monetary 
integration in the Werner Committee meetings, and the creation of the European 
exchange-rate mechanism, the ‘snake’. The sea change in Member-State preferences 
on European monetary cooperation during this five-and-a-half years impressed him. 
When Barre arrived at the Commission, he later claimed that Member-State 
governments had no real understanding of monetary cooperation and ‘refused’ to see 
monetary problems as problems of common interest (Barre 2004: 19). He pointed out 
that many French policy makers saw his first two-page memorandum on monetary 
cooperation of February 1968 as unacceptable, covering matters beyond the 
jurisdiction of the EEC treaty.  
 
Barre left his mark on monetary integration most ostensibly through his memorandum 
of 1969 which informed discussions both among government leaders at the Hague 
Summit of December and in the Werner Committee and led directly to concrete 
initiatives on monetary policy cooperation. He met bilaterally with French President 
Georges Pompidou, German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Jean Monnet prior to the 
Hague summit. Barre (2004: 16) claimed that each of them confirmed that he would 
intervene personally to launch discussions on monetary cooperation. The Commission 
was represented on the Werner Committee by Ugo Mosca. However, Barre (2004: 17) 
followed Committee meetings closely. 
 
De Gaulle’s appointment of Barre to the Commission was of importance – politically, 
symbolically, as well as in terms of economic direction. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
there was a real threat that French governments might resort to safeguard clauses to 
block EEC trade liberalization. The French ‘empty-chair’ crisis of 1965 and the 
subsequent ‘Luxembourg compromise’ were fresh in all minds. Maes (2006) notes 
that influential French officials occupied many of the crucial Community-level 
positions involved in an assessment of national economic situations. Thus Alain Prate 
was secretary of the EEC Monetary Committee; Robert Marjolin was Commissioner; 
and François-Xavier Ortoli was the director-general responsible for the internal 
market. This careful placement of French officials was intentional and designed to 
avoid EC economic policy recommendations that would annoy President de Gaulle 
(Lequesne 2010). Barre’s views on the economy differed from most of these French 
colleagues and, in particular, from Marjolin, his predecessor at the head of DGII, 
notably in terms of his more critical appraisal of Keynesian economic theory and his 
monetarist focus on low inflation. Early in his half-decade term at the Commission, 
Barre manifested a cautious and critical approach to monetary integration. His focus 
was on low inflation and exchange-rate stability.  
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Lequesne (2010) and others insist that Barre’s influence in Brussels, and over both 
French and other Member-State politicians and officials, was considerable because he 
demonstrated impressive economic expertise, intelligence, and efficient 
administrative skills. His economic pragmatism and ‘un-French’ views would have 
been very welcome to officials from other Member States. Thus Barre had little 
enthusiasm for the CAP, which was sacred to de Gaulle, and saw it as something of a 
time-wasting burden (Soutou 2010: 78).  
 
Soutou (2010: 73) argues that Barre played a central role, during his time in Brussels, 
in shifting the opinions of French political leaders away from a return to the gold 
standard, the solution proposed by de Gaulle in 1965, towards a more moderate 
reform of the international monetary system, one that limited the exorbitant privilege 
of the United States (see also Guindey 1973). Similarly, Barre encouraged French 
political leaders to accept the need for European monetary cooperation when an 
acceptable reform of Bretton Woods appeared unlikely. Supported by Giscard 
d’Estaing, the former French finance minister, and the Germans, notably federal 
finance minister Helmut Schmidt, he argued that a return to the (largely) fixed 
exchange rates of Bretton Woods was no longer possible and that a joint float of 
European currencies in relation to the US dollar was necessary (Soutou 2010). This 
shift to greater exchange-rate flexibility in the thinking of the French political 
leadership amounted to what some have described as a ‘cultural revolution’ (Soutou 
2010). It opened the way, under Barre’s leadership, for closer Franco-German 
monetary cooperation. Some see in the ideational approximation of Barre, Giscard 
and Schmidt on monetary and macro-economic questions an important reason behind 
Barre’s appointment as prime minister in 1976 (de Saint Périer 2008). 
 
Barre claims that his time in Brussels resulted in changes to his thinking on the 
economy and the desirability of European monetary cooperation. He claims that in 
being exposed to the economic views of German officials, both in the Commission 
and in the German federal finance ministry, he began to examine even more critically 
the ‘interventionist’ approach of the French administration, its ‘certain lack of 
understanding of the market’ and its tendency toward protectionism (Barre 2000: 19). 
Barre (1984: 208) came to appreciate and concur with the views of his German 
interlocutors on capital market liberalization – and notably on the ineffectiveness of 
capital controls. Well before EC agreements on capital market liberalization, Barre 
made clear his views on the subject and noted the importance of German thinking in 
the development of his own views. In his subsequent writings and interviews, he 
made clear his leanings. In his final report as Commissioner to the Council of Finance 
Ministers (ECOFIN) in 1972, Barre underlined the serious inflationary tensions 
appearing on the horizon and proposed a series of necessary measures to shield 
Member-State economies. He noted that, of the members of ECOFIN, only the 
German federal finance minister, Schmidt, showed his agreement (Barre 2004: 25). 
 
Barre brought about administrative changes in DGII which also reflected his 
economic views (Maes 2006). On his arrival, the existing DGII directorates of 
‘national economies and business cycle’, ‘monetary matters’ and ‘structure and 
development’ reflected the macro-economic policy preoccupations of Commission 
officials, many of them French. ‘Structure and development’, in its focus on medium-
term forecasts, sectoral analyses and structural programmes, took inspiration from the 
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French Planning Commission. To these, Barre added a fourth directorate to focus on 
‘budgetary matters’, reflecting his preoccupation with fiscal deficits and their 
contribution to inflation. Barre also reanimated the Committee of EEC Central Bank 
Governors with the active support and collaboration of the then governor of the 
Banque de France, Bernard Clappier (James 2012). As the chapter by Seidel points 
out, this committee had been created by Marjolin. However, Barre claimed that it had 
barely functioned when he arrived in 1967. Clappier was intimately familiar with the 
European Communities. He had been the head of Robert Schuman’s support staff 
from 1951 to 1953. As the head of the external relations office of the ministry of 
finance from 1951 to 1963, Clappier was one of France’s leading negotiators on the 
Treaty of Rome (Badel 2005). During Barre’s half-decade tenure at the Commission 
and subsequently when he worked at the Banque de France, he attended regularly the 
monthly meetings of the Committee of EEC Central Bank Governors which took 
place after the governors’ Bank for International Settlements meeting in Basel.  
 
Barre’s criticism of French administrative economic thinking did not apply to senior 
Banque de France officials. After Barre’s departure from Brussels, he became a 
member of the council of the Banque de France. In meetings at the bank, and in the 
Committee of EEC Central Bank Governors, he noted that central bankers were in full 
agreement on most matters but that governments tended to ignore them (Barre 2004). 
For Barre, the best mechanism for European cooperation – especially with the demise 
of Bretton Woods – was the Committee of Governors. In France, Barre (2004: 25), 
the independent economist, regularly sided with the central bank against the all-
powerful French Treasury. However, the Treasury kept the central bank on a short 
leash, with limited opportunity to express opinions on monetary policy (Mamou 
1988). 
 
In the aftermath of the May 1968 riots and strike action in France, inflationary wage 
increases and speculation against the franc, the French government made use of the 
EEC treaty safeguard clauses and adopted protectionist measures. Some have argued 
that Barre played a crucial role in convincing President de Gaulle to avoid devaluation 
in November 1968 and to make use of the exchange rate as an external constraint to 
help rein in inflation (Aglietta and Baulant 1993; Lequesne 2010: 61). Barre (2004: 
25) was opposed to the 11.1 per cent devaluation of the franc in August 1969 under 
President Pompidou – whom Barre describes as ‘inflationist’. He argued that it further 
undermined the Bretton Woods fixed exchange-rate system. Barre (ibid: 15) claimed 
that he was very much opposed to the unilateralism of the French devaluation, which 
was announced without any prior communication with the German government. The 
revaluation of the D-Mark in October 1969 further confirmed the beginning of the end 
of a system which had provided two decades of relative monetary stability in Western 
Europe. Barre (1984) saw this 20 per cent realignment as worsening an inflationary 
disequilibrium between France and Germany that persisted for most of the following 
two decades. The European Commission saw exchange-rate instability and macro-
economic imbalances as a direct threat to European market integration. French 
governments also perceived a direct menace to the operation of the CAP (Howarth 
2001). The principal Commission response was to improve policy coordination and 
monetary cooperation. 
 
 
The Barre Plans, 1 and 2 
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While Barre saw exchange-rate stability as a desirable goal, his views on European 
monetary and economic policy cooperation were also tinged with a heavy dose of 
pragmatism. Given the economic conditions of the late 1960s, he recognized the need 
to drop the former insistence upon fixed exchange rates, opting instead for parity 
changes by agreement. Maes (2006: 235) writes of a brief, two-page, memorandum 
presented to the Council in February 1968 (EC Commission 1968). In this the 
Commission called for prior mutual consent to precede exchange-rate adjustments, 
the elimination of fluctuation margins, the introduction of a system of mutual 
assistance, the establishment of a single European unit of account and concerted 
action in international monetary institutions. These Commission proposals reflected 
French thinking on monetary integration and the voluntarist ideas of Robert Triffin 
which had dominated DGII economic thinking under Marjolin. However, they had 
little chance of making headway in the face of German and Dutch opposition. Such a 
‘one-sided monetary approach made no sense’ (Szász 1999: 11). 
 
With a two-sided approach, focused on both improved economic and monetary policy 
cooperation, Barre adopted a position on monetary integration that was a pragmatic 
and deliberately strategic approach, one which could help reconcile the monetarist 
(French) and economist (German) approaches to monetary integration and EMU. 
However, it is important to emphasize that this two-sided approach also conformed 
better to his economic vision. Barre was arguably one of the few Frenchmen who 
could achieve some level of reconciliation between the French and German vision on 
acceptable monetary cooperation. He moved DGII away from Triffin’s European 
Reserve Fund idea, which was unacceptable to the Germans, towards a mutual 
assistance system consistent with Article 108 of the Treaty of Rome. Barre promoted 
‘financial solidarity’, mechanisms offering financial support to weak currency 
Member States under pressure to devalue in the face of speculative financial attacks. 
This solidarity was also to come in the form of financial carrots designed to facilitate 
the introduction of structural reforms, thus potentially extending Commission 
influence. Community mechanisms were presented as more effective to see off 
speculation than isolated national measures. Barre defended the economist approach 
of the German and Dutch governments:  economic convergence was essential to 
ensure stable exchange-rate parities; and monetary union was the ‘crowning’ of 
economic union. Also, he was willing to make statements that would have ruffled 
feathers in Paris, arguing vaguely for example, that, for EMU to be successful, a 
stronger European political authority was needed (Barre 1968: 17). But, in doing this, 
he was expressing his scepticism about the probability of EMU rather than advocating 
further European integration. 
 
At the same time Barre’s vision of European monetary cooperation fitted well with 
some elements of the French Treasury and French government position. This was 
notably the case with regard to the need for monetary policy cooperation, specifically 
cooperation on interest-rate policy, and for support mechanisms. As Commissioner, 
Barre also promoted, albeit briefly, a single European unit of account, a French 
demand since the mid-1960s. However, he dropped this demand in the face of 
German opposition (Fuerxer 2002a). In the 1980s, he was a keen supporter of 
measures to promote the European currency unit (ECU) (Balleix-Banerjee 1999). 
Barre (2004) himself insists that he maintained close relations with French 
governments during his time in Brussels, with regular monthly (even weekly) visits to 
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Paris and regular meetings with the foreign minister, presidents de Gaulle and 
Pompidou, and the secretary-general of the Elysée. These meetings helped to reduce 
the likelihood of friction between his policies at the Commission and French policies. 
By his own account, he bypassed the French permanent representation in Brussels 
(Barre 2004). 
 
Barre sought to build a consensus around a two-sided approach to monetary 
integration that pragmatically combined German and French positions. This approach 
was outlined in the so-called Barre Plan or Memorandum presented to the Council in 
February 1969 (EC Commission 1969). The plan was far more modest and pragmatic 
than the Commission’s Action Programme of 1962. It was also more balanced than 
the memorandum of February 1968. The Barre Plan called for a progressive 
narrowing of the margin of fluctuations among EEC currencies; convergence of 
medium-term economic policies; the coordination of short-term economic policies; 
and support mechanisms. Barre blended the medium-term approach of French 
planning with the German insistence upon economic convergence. Thus convergence 
was to be focused on inflation rates and also pn national economic growth rates and 
balance of payments situations. Maes (2006: 236) notes an important shift in 
Commission thinking on inflation, reflecting heightened concern over disparities in 
prices and costs in Member States. This shift almost certainly reflected Barre’s 
presence at the Commission, given his longstanding pre-occupation with inflation. On 
the coordination of short-term economic policies, Barre proposed the reinforcement 
and more effective application of existing consultation procedures and a system of 
‘early warning’ indicators.  
 
The 1969 Barre Plan had a direct impact on policy. Following a French government 
initiative, in July 1969 the Council agreed to the extension of a May 1964 obligation 
to consult on exchange-rate changes to cover all economic policy measures having an 
impact on other Member States. On support mechanisms, the plan called for both 
unconditional short-term monetary support and conditional medium-term financial 
assistance. While the position of EEC central bank governors on the Barre Plan was 
mixed, with the Germans, Dutch and Italians openly hostile, the plan’s proposal led to 
an arrangement among national central banks to create in February 1970 a 
Community Mechanism for Short-term Monetary Assistance. The Council also 
agreed to create (in March 1971) a medium-term financial assistance facility to assist 
countries suffering from balance of payments difficulties. However, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Italy refused to move beyond limited central bank swaps (Dyson 
1994: 65-71). 
 
Following the Hague Summit, Barre set to work on a communication that was 
presented to the Council on 4 March 1970 (EC Commission 1970). This 
communication – often referred to the Second Barre Plan – reiterated the elements of 
the February Barre Plan. Specifically, it placed emphasis on the convergence of 
national guidelines that should go hand in hand with ‘concerted action in the field of 
economic policy’. However, it also proposed three main steps and a ten-year working 
calendar for the move to an ‘Economic and Monetary Union’. The Second Barre Plan 
focused on ‘attempts to offset the imbalances created by separate action by 
Governments and to make for some degree of coordination’. However, it failed to 
spell out the permanent instruments for common policies (Dell’Amore 1970; Danescu 
2012). Furthermore, it called for the harmonization of national fiscal policies – again 
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without precision. Barre also proposed – as in the February 1968 memorandum – the 
creation of a common, not a single, currency. Effectively then, the Second Barre Plan 
contained the key elements of both the European Monetary System of 1979 and the 
Single European Act of 1985. 
 
The role of the Barre Plan in the history of European monetary integration, and thus 
Barre’s role as an architect, must also be seen in terms of sequencing. The first plan 
was Barre’s arguably more realistic response to Pierre Werner’s far more ambitious 
proposals for monetary union. Indeed, in important respects, the Werner Committee 
followed Barre more closely than Werner’s preceding plan. Barre (2004: 21) claimed 
that the Werner Committee followed his memorandum closely: ‘the work of the 
Werner Committee stems directly from what we put in the Commission 
memorandum’ (author’s translation). Werner made clear his support for the 
memorandum (Lequesne 2010; Danescu 2012).  
 
Specifically, the Werner Plan insisted upon the parallel development of both 
economic convergence and monetary integration. On the former, coordination was 
reinforced and Member States with higher inflation were required to bring this down. 
On the latter, the Werner Plan called for the creation of a fixed but adjustable 
exchange-rate mechanism — later, the ‘snake’ — and the reinforcement of 
centralized funds to be drawn upon to support weak currencies hit by speculation. The 
Werner Committee similarly followed the ten-year working calendar for the creation 
of EMU outlined in the Second Barre Plan (Danescu 2012).  
 
If the Werner Plan of October 1970 is to be considered the founding act of EMU, then 
the Barre Plans should be seen as the conceptual genesis of monetary integration, 
adopted with pragmatism and with full awareness of the difficulties of realizing EMU 
(Lequesne 2010). Barre knew what was necessary to keep the French government 
interested in negotiations on EMU:  cooperation and support mechanisms. At the 
same time he understood German sensitivities and knew that a committee inspired 
explicitly by the work of a Frenchman, even one as credible as Barre, would be 
suspect (Lequesne 2010). Danescu’s chapter in this volume credits Barre with the 
decision to appoint Pierre Werner to chair the committee.  
 
In the context of his liberal inter-governmentalist analysis of European integration, 
Moravscik (1998) describes the Barre Plan as narrow, conservative and redundant. 
However, he dedicates very little attention to the content and logic of the Barre Plan. 
The facts that it led directly to policy changes that were substantiated later by the 
provisions of the Werner Plan and that it set out for the first time the route to Franco-
German compromises on monetary cooperation make the application of the term 
‘redundant’ inappropriate, to say the least. Lequesne (2010), De Boissieu (2010: 24) 
and Danescu (2012) all stress the Werner Plan’s direct inspiration from the Barre 
plans. 
 
 
Barre in Power 
 
Barre is the only French member of the European Commission to date for whom the 
posting was a stepping-stone to a successful political career in France. His 
competence as Commissioner was essential for his appointment as prime minister, 
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given his non-participation in party politics and his negligible experience in 
government. He had been minister for trade for little more than six months.  
 
For Barre (1981 and 1984), the clear lesson to be drawn from the economic 
developments of the first half of the 1970s was that Keynesian stimulation and 
devaluation were not effective tools to achieve sustainable economic growth. During 
this period, French governments experimented unsuccessfully with various schemes 
to shield domestic interest rates from international markets through credit rationing 
(Loriaux 1991). While contributing to short-term stability, capital controls were 
eventually circumvented and in any event reduced the confidence of international 
investors. A risk premium began to be charged on francs, and French domestic 
interest rates began moving toward and then above world market rates. French 
business complained and called for financial liberalization (Loriaux 1991).  
 
In order to deal with France’s inflationary problem, Barre advocated two disciplines 
for the French economy: exchange-rate stability and a lower rate of short-term 
economic growth than that of France’s principal trading partners (de Ménil 2010). His 
policy of stabilization was only in part a success. The franc strengthened, rising 10 
per cent between 1979 and 1981, while at the same time a surplus in the balance of 
payments was achieved for the first time in many years in 1978 and 1979, and for the 
last time until the 2000s. But inflation remained stubbornly high and austerity was 
eased in the year leading to the 1981 presidential elections. 
 
Barre’s reform efforts targeted the inherently inflationary and debt-ridden domestic 
‘overdraft’ economy (de Ménil 2010; Loriaux 1991). The French economy was 
characterized by a high degree of dependence on institutionally allocated credit, the 
so-called ‘treasury circuits’. In 1976, 85 per cent of all finance provided to firms and 
households was provided by banks or some other financial institutions, which 
received most of their funding from the Bank of France. The generous provision of 
credits resulted in excessively casual cash-flow management in both firms and banks 
which led to a high level of indebtedness of firms to banks, and of banks to the Bank 
of France. Alternative sources of finance were severely underdeveloped, meaning the 
virtual nonexistence of a financial market in the mid-1970s.  
 
The ‘overdraft’ economy was the product of successive governments’ unwillingness 
to tackle the political legacy of postwar growth-oriented industrial policies (Loriaux 
1991). It created structures and patterns of financial behavior that increased the 
difficulty of achieving monetary stabilization in France and were politically difficult 
to change. It relied upon the ‘encadrement du crédit’ or ‘tightening of credit’ — a 
clumsy tool of economic policy — to combat domestic inflation. Moreover, monetary 
policymakers of the 1950s and the 1960s attributed endemic inflationary pressure in 
the economy to fiscal deficits — as did Barre — and sought to use fiscal policy to 
fight it. While the ‘overdraft’ economy could be tolerated during periods of low-
inflationary economic growth, the inflationary impact of the Grenelle wage accords of 
1968 and the rise in oil prices during the 1970s underlined its structural weakness.  
 
Barre brought about both financial innovation and liberalization, beginning the reform 
of the ‘encadrement de credit’ system that Socialist finance ministers Jacques Delors 
and Pierre Bérégovoy subsequently broadened. The Monory Act of July 1978 offered 
tax incentives for the development of the stock market: mutual funds were created in 
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July 1979 and new types of short-term assets in September 1981. By early 1983, 
Delors pursued further liberalization so that, by the time the Right returned to power 
in 1986, the financing of the largest French companies from capital markets, stocks 
and bonds had risen to around 75 per cent, up from less than 25 per cent at the start of 
the decade. 
 
Barre’s reform efforts were supported by the big business community in France, with 
keen support from the CNPF (Conseil National du Patronat Français), but from few 
others. His discourse focused on adapting France to the changing conditions of the 
world economy (Barre 1981 and 1984). However, Barre was isolated politically, 
opposed by Keynesians not only on the Socialist Left but also on the Gaullist Right. 
The combination of the failure of the previous Gaullist government of Jacques Chirac 
to keep the franc in the ‘snake’ mechanism, the devaluation of 1975, the surge in 
inflation and stagflation emboldened Barre as prime minister. It created a brief 
window of opportunity for alternative policies. As a result of his reform efforts, Barre 
was, by the early 1980s, an unpopular prime minister, so much so that Giscard 
d’Estaing pushed him aside entirely in the 1981 presidential elections (de Saint Périer 
2013: 118). 
 
Barre’s support for the EMS was not about the inherent merits of European monetary 
integration. President Giscard d’Estaing was pre-occupied with Franco-German 
relations and France’s position in Europe and the world. However, in the case of 
Barre there are no indications in any of his writings from the period or since that he 
saw the EMS in terms of broader European or international geo-strategic goals or 
even in terms of further European economic integration. Barre appears not to have 
shared the view, which was widespread in French policy making circles, that 
European monetary integration through the construction of a more symmetric EMS, 
or later a single currency, could be a mechanism to contain German monetary and 
economic power (Howarth 2001).  
 
Barre’s appointment as prime minister was significant in that, while Gaullist in his 
reflexes on national sovereignty with a preference for intergovernmentalism at the 
European level, he was less under the yolk of a sovereignty-minded neo-Gaullism. 
Indeed, he was the first non-Gaullist or non-neo-Gaullist prime minister of the post-
1958 French Fifth Republic. This factor gave him a certain intellectual margin of 
manoeuvre at both the national and European levels. Amouroux (1986: 98) quotes 
Barre on his time in Brussels:  
 
… and I let it be known that if I was European, I was not a supra-
nationalist, and that if I was Gaullist, my views were not determined 
solely by Gaullism (author’s translation; see also Soutou 2010).  
 
More importantly, Barre saw in the EMS a crucial external constraint to achieve 
domestic economic objectives:  microeconomic austerity and renewed 
competitiveness for French firms; and macroeconomic discipline to keep inflation 
down and public spending under control (Aglietta and Baulant 1993). If France was to 
become ‘the best student’ of Germany — an expression frequently and often critically 
applied to Giscard and the Barre Government — Barre was the teacher’s top assistant 
(Howarth 2001). Barre sought to increase French competitiveness through a strong 
currency, as the Germans had done, and by encouraging less price-sensitive, higher 
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technology export industries such as electronics, automobiles, aerospace and 
transport. A stronger currency would assist with domestic efforts to rationalize 
traditional industries, such as telecommunications and steel, and force contraction in 
price-sensitive, labour-intensive sectors. The aim was to emulate the German austerity 
of the early 1970s that had successfully prevented inflation in that country (Ludlow 
1982). 
 
While the focus of historians working on the origins of the EMS has been on the 
central position of Giscard and Schmidt, Barre also played a significant role in the 
discussions and negotiations leading to the Bremen Accords. He met Chancellor 
Schmidt on several occasions in 1977 and 1978 to discuss reinforced monetary 
cooperation (Soutou 2010). Henri Froment-Meurice (1998), the director of economic 
affairs at the ministry of foreign affairs at the time, outlined Barre’s role in detail. 
Barre was committed to the creation of the EMS, but he was also cautious about the 
need for gradual adjustment for the French economy. He would have preferred four or 
five years more to reform the domestic economy and liberalize industrial prices prior 
to the launch of the EMS. The need for readjustment to ease the burden for France 
reinforced his longstanding preference for ‘fixed but adjustable’ exchange rates.  
 
While previously a trenchant opponent of British entry into the EEC, Barre was 
nonetheless very energetic in his efforts to encourage British participation in the 
EMS. His aim was to dilute what he saw as the inevitable asymmetry of the system 
with the D-Mark as the anchor currency, although he never specifically used the term 
asymmetry (Soutou 2010: 77). When these efforts to encourage British participation 
failed, he nonetheless accepted the EMS ‘such as it was’ (ibid.: 77).  
 
Barre was very much aware that EMS membership meant for France the pursuit of 
considerable reform over the long term and macro-economic convergence with 
Germany (Soutou 2010). Nevertheless, the Bremen Accords corresponded in large 
part to the aims of the first and the second Barre plans and subsequently to the broad 
thrust of French policy on monetary cooperation. This correspondence was apparent 
in the insistence upon greater symmetry in European monetary arrangements than 
under the ‘snake’ both through more generous support mechanisms and through 
mutual realignments and the commitment of strong-currency national central banks to 
preserve exchange-rate parities. However, for Barre, the creation of a more symmetric 
ERM was definitely not about relaxing the French push on austerity and about 
burden-sharing with the Germans, as it was for many other French policy makers in 
the 1980s (Howarth 2001). It was about facilitating reform by decreasing the pain of 
the external constraint. 
 
 
Barre’s Contribution and Legacy 
 
Of all the architects examined in this volume, Barre was almost certainly the least 
supra-nationalist and his interest in European monetary integration was the most 
driven by purely domestic economic considerations. Nonetheless, Barre merits entry 
into the pantheon of EMU architects, despite his cautious views regarding EMU and 
his failure to demonstrate any public support for the adoption of a single currency 
prior to the Maastricht European Council in December 1991. Barre came out strongly 
in favour of the single currency only after the Maastricht Summit of December 1991 
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(Barre 1992). 
 
Crucially, as a rare Frenchman of influence, favourable to the German economist 
approach to EMU, Barre was able to forward a consensual vision of European 
monetary cooperation. The Barre plan of 1969 set the agenda for discussions in the 
Werner Committee. It also led directly to the creation of short-term and medium-term 
EEC support mechanisms which facilitated French support for European exchange-
rate mechanisms. Barre was one of the earliest French policy makers to see a 
European exchange-rate mechanism – the ‘snake’ and then the ERM – as a useful 
disciplinary device that would help to enforce necessary anti-inflation reforms in the 
face of the resistance of influential domestic interests. In this way, Barre sought to 
increase government control over the domestic economy by surrendering some 
margin of manoeuvre over monetary policy. While the extent of reform was limited 
during the Barre government itself, this motive was nonetheless important in 
determining his support for the EMS. More significant reform had to wait until a 
Socialist government began its serious restructuring of domestic financial markets in 
1984. Barre was, from the late 1960s, an ardent supporter of capital liberalization, 
another ideational import from his experience at the European Commission. Although 
he did not achieve full capital liberalization during his five years as prime minister, 
the French government adopted a range of liberalization measures which facilitated its 
agreement to the OECD and EC engagements on full liberalization in the 1980s.  
 
Barre’s focus on low inflation and a strong currency, combined with microeconomic 
reform to improve the competitiveness of the French economy, put him at odds with 
most of the French political class in the 1970s. However, these ideas formed the 
bedrock of the ideational consensus of the late 1980s and 1990s that allowed France’s 
participation in an EMU project, the design of which was largely dictated by German 
macroeconomic preferences.  
 
Despite Barre’s crucial role in monetary integration history, the claim of several 
observers, including de Boissieu (2010: 24), that EMU was ‘at the heart of the 
Raymond Barre project’ is highly contestable. This claim is at worst ahistorical or at 
best relies on a very loose – indeed pre-Maastricht French – understanding of EMU, 
certainly one very different from the project that was finally agreed. Rather, European 
monetary cooperation served clear domestic economic objectives that dominated 
Barre’s policy making even during his five and a half years at the Commission. 				
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